CYBER WELFARE

Protect your Digital Privacy

Using Tor Browser when what you do must not be linked to who you are

Helen works for an architecture practice in Milan and is overseeing the refurbishment of a school for a nearby town council. One afternoon, going through a subcontractor’s paperwork, she notices something odd: material certificates that look copied from another site, dates that do not match. It may be a mistake or something more serious; she has not decided whether to report it. First she wants to understand how reporting works and what is said about the firm.

She is about to search from the office computer, then stops. That computer is on the practice’s network, signed in to her work account, its history synced with her phone. The firm’s website would see visits from the practice’s address in the very week of the checks. What she is about to look up would tell more than one person who is looking, and why.

This recommendation, R45 of the Cyber Welfare Framework, helps you work out when to use Tor Browser: for most of what you do online you do not need it, but when what you search for, read or write must not be traceable to you, it is the tool designed for the job. It also sets out the few habits that let it work properly.

What this recommendation says

Recommendation R45 states that, when an online activity must not be linked to your identity, you carry it out in Tor Browser, in a session kept apart from everything else.

A few terms to clear up straight away:

  • Tor is a free network run by volunteers and organisations around the world. It is developed by the Tor Project, a US non-profit;
  • a relay (or node) is one of the computers on the Tor network your connection passes through; the chain of three relays used in a session is called a circuit;
  • Tor Browser is the Tor Project’s browser: it sends your traffic through the Tor network and is built to leave fewer traces than an ordinary browser;
  • “New Identity” is the Tor Browser feature that closes everything you have open, clears cookies and history and uses new circuits, so that what you do next is not linked to what you did before.

Normally the website you visit sees your IP address, the number that identifies your connection, and your internet provider sees which sites you visit. With Tor, the connection crosses three relays: the first sees your address but not where you are going, the last knows where you are going but not who you are, and the one in the middle knows neither. According to the Tor Project, this is exactly what stops any single point on the network from knowing both your identity and your activity.

In practice, the recommendation comes down to two choices:

  • recognise the moments when you need it: a sensitive search, a report, something you want to read without your name attached;
  • use it with a clean session: official source, updates, no accounts or add-ons, downloaded files opened afterwards, “New Identity” at the end.

What it is not. It is not a guide to the so-called “dark web” or to the illegal services sometimes associated with it. It does not make you invisible: your network can see you use Tor, and what you write about yourself still identifies you. It does not replace everyday protections: for normal browsing, a browser that limits tracking and fingerprinting and the habit of browsing only over HTTPS are enough. And it is not a VPN: when a VPN genuinely helps, and for which different purposes, is explained in the recommendation on using a VPN for sensitive traffic.

Where it applies. To web browsing on a computer or phone, when the link between you and what you do matters. Not to email or other apps: Tor only protects the traffic of applications set up to use it.

Why it matters

Ordinary browsing leaves links we rarely notice: your IP address, account cookies, synced history, the features that make your browser recognisable. For checking the weather that is fine. For some activities, though, those links say more than you would like, to people you did not choose.

Tor Browser works on all those links at once. The Tor Project explains that traffic is encrypted three times as it crosses the network, that each site is isolated so trackers cannot follow you, that cookies and history are cleared at the end and that all users are made to look alike, so your browser’s fingerprint does less to single you out.

The Tor Project is also frank about the limits. On its best-practice page it says that, in general, perfect anonymity is impossible even with Tor; that by default Tor does not stop someone watching your traffic from learning that you are using it; and that if you sign in to a site, that site does not know your location but does know who you are. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a US digital rights organisation, adds in its guide (reviewed on 28/01/2025) that browsing over Tor is much slower and that some websites may not work.

Using Tor is a legitimate choice. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, in the report of 22/05/2015 on encryption and anonymity, notes that journalists, researchers, lawyers and civil society rely on these tools to protect themselves. The same report notes that some states try to block access to it, and things change over time: according to the Tor Project, some providers in Russia began blocking it from 01/12/2021, and in Turkmenistan use dropped sharply from July 2021 because of blocking. Rules vary from country to country: if you travel, check what applies where you are.

Benefit of using Tor Browser when you need itWhy it matters
The site does not see your connection’s addressYour location and your provider stay out of the visit
Your internet provider does not see which sites you visitIt sees that you use Tor, not what you read
The session does not add to your historyWhat you search for does not turn up in tomorrow’s suggestions
Each site is isolated from the othersTrackers struggle to follow you from page to page
Little is left at the end“New Identity” closes the session and clears the traces in the browser

A concrete example

Back to Helen.

That evening, at home, she uses Tor Browser for her research. She has never used it. She downloads it from the Tor Project’s official website, typing the address by hand, and installs it on her personal laptop.

First she writes a rule on a scrap of paper: “Tonight I read; I sign in to nothing.” Tor Browser tells her an update is available: she installs it straight away. She does not add the ad blocker she uses in her everyday browser, and she leaves the security level as it is.

She reads the national anti-corruption authority’s pages on reporting and finds something she did not expect. In 2018 the Tor Project reported that the authority had launched its national reporting platform as an onion service too, that is, a site reachable only through the Tor network. How to access it today she will check on the authority’s official website, if and when she decides to report.

She downloads a PDF. Tor Browser warns that opening it in another program could take it outside the Tor network: she just saves it, clicks “New Identity” at the end and reads it the next morning, offline.

One thing is clear to her: Tor Browser separates her searches from her connection and her accounts, but if she ever writes a report, the facts only she knows could still point to who wrote it. For that part, what counts is the official channel’s rules and the protections the law provides, not the browser.

When to apply it

There are moments when Tor Browser makes an obvious difference.

  • When you are looking for information you do not want linked to your name. A legal question, a dispute with family or with a company, a subject that concerns only you.
  • When you are preparing or sending a report. Some official channels offer access via Tor precisely to protect whoever is reporting.
  • When you do not want a site to know where you are connecting from. For instance, the website of someone who might recognise your network’s address.
  • When a news site is hard to reach from where you are. Some outlets offer an onion version; check the local rules first.

And there are moments when you do not need it: online banking and personal accounts, where you sign in with your own name anyway, and everyday browsing, for which a good browser is enough.

How to apply it

You need no expertise, just a short sequence, the same every time.

  1. Decide what the session is for. One line will do: “I read this; I do not sign in to that”. One activity per session avoids linking two of them together.
  2. Download Tor Browser only from the official website. It is the same principle as the recommendation on downloading apps only from official stores: fake copies of Tor Browser have been spread through lookalike websites.
  3. Keep it up to date, as the recommendation on keeping your software up to date advises: the Tor Project warns that an old version exposes you to serious vulnerabilities.
  4. Do not sign in to your usual accounts. Signing in tells the site who you are and ties the whole session to you. If an activity needs your account, use your everyday browser.
  5. Do not add add-ons or change the settings. Every change makes your Tor Browser more recognisable. You can raise the security level, but that is a choice to make calmly.
  6. Check for HTTPS. Before you type anything, make sure the address starts with “https://” and shows the name you expect: the last stretch, from the network’s exit to the site, is protected only that way.
  7. Open downloaded files only afterwards. A document opened in another program can connect to the internet outside Tor and reveal your address. Read it once the session is closed, offline.
  8. Close with “New Identity”. It separates this activity from the next.
  9. If Tor is blocked where you are, first find out about the local rules and read the Tor Project’s official pages, which explain what bridges are: relays that are not publicly listed.

The habits in priority order, with what to do if something goes wrong, are in the guide on how to browse anonymously. How the network works, relay by relay, is explained in the post on the Tor network and onion services.

Common mistakes to avoid

  • Thinking Tor makes you invisible. It hides where you connect from, not who you are if you say so yourself: a name, an email address, a personal fact is enough to link you back.
  • Signing in “just for a moment”. One sign-in is enough to tie the whole session to your account, including the pages you visited before.
  • Customising Tor Browser like your usual browser. Add-ons, themes, an enlarged browser frame: the more personal it is, the more it stands out.
  • Opening downloads straight away. It is the easiest way to leave Tor without noticing.

How this connects to the Cyber Welfare Framework

R45 is the step that follows the recommendation on deciding how much anonymity you need: once you have worked out that an activity must not be linked to you, Tor Browser is the tool that makes it possible, provided you use it with the right habits.

PillarHow this contributes
SkillsKnowing how to install Tor Browser from the official source, keep it updated, check for HTTPS and close the session with “New Identity”
AwarenessUnderstanding what ordinary browsing links to you, what Tor loosens and what stays in your hands
Secure BehaviourRecognising the moments when it is needed and using a clean session every time, with no accounts, add-ons or files opened during the session

Digital maturity levels.

  • FL1 — Basic. You browse with a single browser, signed in to your accounts, and do not ask yourself what links your searches to you. It is the most common starting point, not a fault.
  • FL2 — Beginner. You know that your IP address, accounts and cookies link your browsing to you, and you use a browser that limits tracking.
  • FL3 — Autonomous. You know when Tor Browser is needed and use it with a clean session: official source, updates, no accounts, no add-ons, files afterwards, “New Identity”.
  • FL4 — Skilled. You choose the right security level, recognise an organisation’s official onion services and know Tor’s limits, such as traffic correlation.
  • FL5 — Expert-Guide. You help others understand when Tor is needed and when it is not, without drama, and point anyone facing serious risk towards specialist organisations.

R45 is the key step towards FL3 — Autonomous, from knowing that browsing leaves links to loosening them when it matters.

How to check you are applying it properly

Three questions, to be answered honestly.

  • For the last thing I looked up in Tor Browser, could I say why I did it there and not in my usual browser?
  • During that session, did I sign in to anything, or open a downloaded file?
  • Is my copy of Tor Browser up to date, and did I download it from the official website?

Quick checklist

  • ☐ I can recognise an activity that must not be linked to me
  • ☐ I downloaded Tor Browser from the Tor Project’s official website
  • ☐ I update it as soon as it asks
  • ☐ In Tor Browser sessions I do not sign in to my usual accounts
  • ☐ I have not added any add-ons, and I open downloaded files only after the session
  • ☐ I close every session with “New Identity”

If a box stays empty, you already have your next step. For a more structured measure of your level, take the digital resilience self-assessment.

In short

Ordinary browsing links what you do to who you are: through your connection’s address, your accounts, cookies and the browser itself. Most of the time that is fine. When it is not, Tor Browser splits what is known about your connection between three relays, so that no one has the full picture.

It works if you let it: official source, updates, no accounts, no add-ons, files opened afterwards, “New Identity” at the end. And it does not do what remains up to you: what you write, and who you write it to, still speaks about you.

Something to think about. Among the things you looked up online in the last month, is there one you would rather not have had linked to your name?

Explore this recommendation

This recommendation is the pivot of a content unit. Each post looks at a different aspect.

Related resources

Short reads from the Resources section, for anyone who wants to focus on a single aspect:

Start with the first step: the Cyber Welfare Programme guides you free of charge, one recommendation at a time.