Tor Browser is built to loosen the links between you and what you do online, and in most cases it does that well. But no tool is perfect, and the Tor Project itself says so openly: in general, perfect anonymity is impossible even with Tor. Anyone who wants to expose a person using Tor rarely attacks the network itself: they look for the points where the protection ends, or where the person, without realising it, removes it.
Attacks on Tor users are the ways someone tries to read what you do, link it to you or get you to use a version of the browser that does not protect you. Some exploit known limits of the network; many exploit ordinary habits, such as opening a document or trusting a link.
This post explains the most common techniques and why they become more effective when the habits of a clean session slip. It is the threat-side companion to the recommendation on when to use Tor Browser. The signs that tell you a session is exposing you are gathered in the post on the signs your Tor session is exposing you.
A useful clarification: this post explains how these abuses work from the point of view of the people on the receiving end, so they can be recognised and prevented. They are not operating instructions, and the post contains nothing useful for attacking the network or the people who use it.
Starting scenario
Imagine someone who has heard that Tor “makes you anonymous”. They search for “Tor Browser” and download the top result. They open it, install the add-on they always use, and sign in to their email to retrieve a link. They visit a site without HTTPS to read a document, download it and open it at once. The following week they ignore the update notice because they are in a hurry. To reach an onion service, they use an address found in a list on a forum.
None of these actions, on its own, is a disaster. Together, though, they open exactly the doors the techniques described here are looking for.
Hardly anyone thinks about it. Anyone who wants to take advantage, on the other hand, is counting on exactly that.
Why habits matter more than the network
All the techniques described here have one thing in common: they do not need to “break” Tor; they count on a point where the protection stops.
The Tor network hides where you connect from by splitting the route between three relays. But the protection ends at specific points: at the network’s exit, where traffic to a site without HTTPS travels in the clear; at the browser’s boundary, where a document opened in another program uses your normal connection; in the browser itself, if it is a fake copy or an old version; and in what you write, which no network can hide.
With a clean session, almost all these techniques lose their force. Without one, they have a good chance of succeeding.
1. The exit relay that reads or alters unencrypted traffic
In plain words. The exit relay is the last computer on the Tor network, the one that delivers your traffic to the site. If the site does not use HTTPS, whoever runs that relay can read what passes through and, in some cases, alter it.
How it works. Relays are run by volunteers, and some people do so with bad intentions. The Tor Project has reported that in May and June 2020 a group of exit relays targeted unencrypted connections to a small number of cryptocurrency exchange websites; those relays were removed from the network. The EFF notes that it is technically possible for exit nodes to be monitored.
Why some habits help it. The exit relay does not know who you are, but it sees whatever you send without encryption. A password typed into a page without HTTPS can be read, even if nobody knows whose it is.
Possible impacts. Credentials read, pages altered, links swapped for others.
What to watch for. The page address does not start with “https://”; the browser shows a warning next to the address; a page asks for data without encryption.
How to protect yourself. Leave Tor Browser’s HTTPS-Only mode on and do not enter data on unencrypted pages, as the recommendation on browsing only over HTTPS explains. When an organisation offers an onion service, use it: the traffic never leaves the network.
2. Timing correlation between entry and exit
In plain words. Someone able to watch both the traffic entering the Tor network on your side and the traffic leaving it towards the site can try to link the two by comparing when, and how much, traffic passes.
How it works. Tor is not designed to withstand someone watching both ends of the connection. The Tor Project said so explicitly on 15/11/2014: Tor’s design does not try to protect against someone who can see or measure both the traffic going into the network and the traffic coming out; according to the same post, though, the more users there are, the less certain such matching becomes. ENISA, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, also notes in a January 2022 report that Tor remains vulnerable to anyone observing traffic both on the way in and on the way out.
Why some habits help it. The longer a session stays open, and the more different activities it contains, the more material it offers anyone trying to compare. The same goes for sessions repeated at the same time, from the same network, to the same site.
Possible impacts. The link between your connection and a specific site, which Tor was trying to prevent.
What to watch for. In practice, nothing visible: it is a limit to be aware of, not something you notice.
How to protect yourself. For most people the risk is low. Keep sessions short and to one purpose, separate them with “New Identity”, and do not rely on Tor as your only protection if your risk is serious and targeted. In that case, contact a specialist organisation such as Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline for journalists, activists and civil society: it is free, available 24 hours a day and works in several languages, including English.
3. The document that reveals your address
In plain words. A file downloaded with Tor Browser and opened in another program while you are connected can contact the internet over your normal connection.
How it works. Some documents contain references to online resources, such as images or fonts, which the program fetches when you open them. The Tor Project warns that this can reveal your non-Tor IP address. That is why Tor Browser warns you before opening a file in an external application.
Why some habits help it. Opening whatever you download straight away is automatic. The warning gets dismissed with a click, in a hurry.
Possible impacts. Whoever prepared the document, or whoever runs the resource it points to, can see your real address and link it to the visit.
What to watch for. A document opening in another program during the session; Tor Browser’s warning about external applications; files received from sources you do not know.
How to protect yourself. Save files and open them only after the session, offline, or do not open them at all if you do not need them. For files from unknown sources, the caution of the recommendation on not opening unknown attachments applies.
4. The fake copy of Tor Browser
In plain words. Someone distributes a program that looks like Tor Browser but has been modified to steal data or track whoever uses it.
How it works. In 2019 the EFF reported a tampered version of Tor Browser, discovered by security researchers, spread through websites with names similar to the official one and advertised on some forums. It showed fake “out of date” warnings to push people into downloading it, included a counterfeit add-on and changed cryptocurrency wallet addresses; according to the EFF, the total stolen was around 40,000 US dollars. The same browser was configured in a way that made its victims recognisable.
Why some habits help it. Searching for the program and clicking the top result, or a link someone sent, is the quickest route. It is also the one the fake copy is waiting for.
Possible impacts. Theft of money or credentials; tracking of people who believed they were protected.
What to watch for. A download site with a name almost identical to the official one; an update notice coming from a web page rather than from the browser’s menu; add-ons present from the moment of installation.
How to protect yourself. Download Tor Browser only from the Tor Project’s official website, typing the address by hand; update it from within the browser. It is the same principle as the recommendation on downloading apps only from official stores.
5. The counterfeit onion site
In plain words. Someone creates a copy of an onion service, with an address similar to the real one, to collect data from whoever lands on it.
How it works. Onion addresses are long strings of letters and numbers, hard to remember and to compare by eye. Whoever creates a copy counts on few people checking the whole address, especially when they find it in a list, on a forum or in a message. The Tor Project points out that the onion icon alone does not tell you that you are on the right site.
Why some habits help it. Trusting an address found who knows where, instead of taking it from the organisation’s official website.
Possible impacts. Credentials, messages or documents handed to whoever runs the copy.
What to watch for. An onion address received from a source other than the organisation itself; a page that asks you to sign in or pay straight away; small differences in appearance.
How to protect yourself. Take an onion address only from the organisation’s official website, or from the “.onion available” label Tor Browser shows when the site itself advertises it, and save it as a bookmark. The technologies are described in the post on the Tor network and onion services.
6. The vulnerability in an outdated browser
In plain words. An old version of Tor Browser may have known flaws that a malicious page exploits to run code on your device or reveal who is using it.
How it works. Like any program, Tor Browser receives security fixes. The Tor Project says the browser must be kept up to date at all times, because using an outdated version exposes you to serious vulnerabilities that can lead to deanonymisation, that is, discovering who is behind the session. Websites’ more complex features, such as JavaScript, are the most common route for these flaws.
Why some habits help it. Putting the update off “until later”, or using Tor Browser rarely and finding it out of date just when you need it.
Possible impacts. Your real address revealed to whoever runs the page; in the worst cases, code run on your device.
What to watch for. The update notice in the main menu; a version installed long ago and never updated.
How to protect yourself. Update as soon as the browser asks and, for sites you do not trust much, raise the security level. Why updates matter is explained in the post on the consequences of outdated software.
Summary table
| Technique | Main risk | What to watch for | Effective defences |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dishonest exit relay | Unencrypted traffic read or altered | Page without HTTPS, warnings next to the address | HTTPS-Only mode, onion services |
| Timing correlation | Entry and exit linked | Nothing visible | Short, separate sessions; specialist help if the risk is serious |
| Document revealing your address | Real address exposed | Warning about external applications | Open files after the session, offline |
| Fake copy of Tor Browser | Data theft, tracking | Lookalike site, fake update notices | Official website only, updates from the browser |
| Counterfeit onion site | Data handed to the copy | Address from an unofficial source | Address from the organisation’s website, bookmarks |
| Outdated browser | Deanonymisation, code run | Update notice | Update straight away, higher security level |
What they have in common
Six different techniques, three defences that work against almost all of them:
- An original, up-to-date browser — downloaded only from the official website, updated as soon as it asks, with no add-ons.
- Nothing that leaves Tor — HTTPS or onion services for anything you type, files opened only after the session.
- Short sessions with one purpose — no sign-ins to your accounts, “New Identity” at the end, addresses taken from official sources.
These are not advanced measures: they are habits you can pick up in a few minutes. How, more generally, a person is linked back to what they do online is explained in the post on how deanonymisation works.
Protection checklist
- ☐ I downloaded Tor Browser from the official website and update it as soon as it asks
- ☐ I have not added any add-ons
- ☐ I leave HTTPS-Only mode on and do not enter data on unencrypted pages
- ☐ I open downloaded files only after the session, offline
- ☐ I take onion addresses only from the organisation’s official website
- ☐ I keep sessions short and close them with “New Identity”
- ☐ If my risk is serious, I know who to turn to
How this connects to the Cyber Welfare Framework
| Pillar | How this content contributes |
|---|---|
| Awareness | Understanding where Tor’s protection ends: at the network’s exit, at the browser’s boundary, in a fake copy, in what you write |
| Skills | Recognising the techniques, from the dishonest exit relay to the document that reveals your address and the counterfeit onion site |
| Secure Behaviour | Using an original, up-to-date browser, letting nothing leave Tor and keeping sessions short and to one purpose |
Reference level: FL3 — Autonomous, with elements of FL4 — Skilled in the parts on timing correlation and onion services.
Conclusion
The techniques described here rarely “break” Tor. They rely on the points where the protection ends, and on ordinary actions, such as opening a file or clicking the top result, that remove it without our noticing.
That is why the most effective defence is not giving up Tor, but using it well: an original, up-to-date browser, nothing that leaves the network, short sessions with one purpose. To find out whether one of your sessions is already exposing you, the next step is the signs your Tor session is exposing you; for a broader view of your digital habits, you can start with the digital resilience self-assessment.
Something to think about. If you had to download Tor Browser today, could you tell the official website from one that looks like it?
Related resources
Short reads from the Resources section, for anyone who wants to focus on a single aspect:
- What Is HTTPS? What the Padlock Tells You, and What It Doesn’t
- Download Security: Deciding Before You Install
Related content
- When to use Tor Browser — the recommendation this post comes from
- Signs your Tor session is exposing you — the indicators to check
- How to browse anonymously — the steps to prevent and put things right
- Tor network and onion services — the technologies that protect the session
- What traceable browsing can lead to — what happens when the link with you is rebuilt
- Traffic interception: who gets in between — the related topic of who sits between you and the site
Start with the first step: the Cyber Welfare Programme guides you free of charge, one recommendation at a time.




