CYBER WELFARE

Protect your Digital Privacy

Tor network and onion services: how they work, and who sees what

Tor Browser looks like any other browser. Behind it, though, is a network built differently from the one we use every day, and features designed to loosen the links between you and what you do. You do need to know what each one does, what it does not do, and when it matters.

This post is a guide to the Tor network and onion services, and to the technologies that go with them: relays and the circuit, layered encryption, the browser’s protections, onion services, bridges, security levels and the “New Identity” feature. Menu names change between versions; we describe them in general terms.

It is the technical side of the recommendation on when to use Tor Browser. The practical sequence for using these technologies, in the right order, is in the guide on how to browse anonymously.

How to read this list

The technologies are split into four groups, like the phases of security:

  • prevention: they stop any single point on the network from knowing both who you are and what you do;
  • detection: they show you how your connection is travelling;
  • response: they let you separate one activity from another or limit what a site can do;
  • governance: they set out who runs the network, how it can be reached where it is blocked and how a protected service is offered.

For each technology you will find the risk it reduces, its strengths, its limits, an example of use and how complex it is. One principle applies to all of them: Tor does not hide everything from everyone; it splits what is known about your connection, so that nobody has the full picture.

Who sees what

Before the individual technologies, a table summing up the result. The rows describe a visit to an ordinary HTTPS website, made with Tor Browser without signing in to any account.

WhoWhat they seeWhat they do not see
Whoever runs your network, or your internet providerThat you use TorWhich sites you visit
The entry relay (guard)Your IP addressThe site you visit and the content
The middle relayThe relay before and the relay afterWho you are and where you are going
The exit relayThe site you visitWho you are; the content, if the site uses HTTPS
The siteA visit from the exit relay’s addressYour IP address, unless you give it away
The site, if you sign inWho you areWhere you are connecting from

The last row is the most important: the Tor Project points out that, if you sign in, the site does not know your location but does know who you are.

1. Prevention technologies

Relays and the circuit

The Tor network is made up of thousands of relays, computers run by volunteers and organisations around the world. Tor Browser routes your connection through three of them: the entry relay, also called the guard, the middle relay and the exit relay. The chain of three is the circuit. According to the Tor Project, each relay knows only which relay it received the data from and which one it is passing it to.

  • Risk reduced: a single point on the network knowing both who you are and what you do.
  • Strengths: you do not have to trust a single company, as you do with a VPN.
  • Limits: browsing is slower; anyone watching both the entry and the exit of the network can, in theory, link the two sides.
  • Example of use: you read a website without it seeing your connection’s address.
  • Complexity: low for Tor Browser users: the circuit builds itself.

Layered encryption

Before it leaves your device, the traffic is wrapped in several layers of encryption, one for each relay. Each relay removes only its own layer, like the layers of an onion, hence the name “onion routing”. The Tor Project sums it up: traffic is relayed and encrypted three times as it crosses the network.

  • Risk reduced: relays along the way reading where you are going.
  • Strengths: no relay holds the whole route.
  • Limits: at the network’s exit, the stretch to the site is protected only if the site uses HTTPS.
  • Example of use: the middle relay passes on data without knowing where it came from or where it is going.
  • Complexity: none for browser users.

Site isolation and fingerprinting protection

Tor Browser isolates each site: one site’s cookies and data are not visible to the others. It also tries to make all its users look the same, so that your browser’s fingerprint, the set of characteristics a site can read, does less to single you out. At the end of a session it clears cookies and history.

  • Risk reduced: trackers following you from site to site, browser recognition.
  • Strengths: it works without any set-up.
  • Limits: every add-on or settings change makes you more recognisable again.
  • Example of use: an ad you saw on one site does not follow you to the next.
  • Complexity: low, as long as you leave the browser as it is.

HTTPS-Only mode

Tor Browser includes a mode that accepts only HTTPS connections with the sites that support it. According to the Tor Project, it has been on by default on desktop since version 11.5 (14/07/2022), partly to reduce the incentive to run dishonest exit relays.

  • Risk reduced: traffic between the exit relay and the site being read or altered.
  • Strengths: it protects the last stretch without your having to think about it.
  • Limits: it does not cover sites that offer no HTTPS; it does not tell you whether the site is the right one.
  • Example of use: an unencrypted site is opened over HTTPS, or you are asked whether to continue.
  • Complexity: low.

2. Detection technologies

The tab’s circuit

In the panel with information about the site, next to the address, Tor Browser shows the circuit used for that tab, with the country of each relay.

  • Risk reduced: not knowing whether, and how, your connection is going through Tor.
  • Strengths: you see the three hops at a glance.
  • Limits: it does not tell you who runs those relays or whether anyone is watching them.
  • Example of use: a site shows content from another country, and you see why.
  • Complexity: low.

The Tor Project’s check page

The Tor Project offers a page that tells you whether the browser you are using is connected to the Tor network.

  • Risk reduced: using your everyday browser by mistake, believing you are on Tor.
  • Strengths: a clear, immediate answer.
  • Limits: it checks the connection, not your habits.
  • Example of use: after opening a link from another app, you check which browser you are in.
  • Complexity: low.

Connection status and onion addresses

Next to the address, Tor Browser shows an icon indicating the state of the connection; when you visit an onion service, an onion-shaped icon appears. Some sites also advertise that they have an onion version: the Tor Project explains that in that case an “.onion available” label may appear in the address bar.

  • Risk reduced: missing an unencrypted connection.
  • Strengths: the warning appears where you are already looking.
  • Limits: the Tor Project points out that the icon alone does not tell you that you are on the right site.
  • Example of use: an icon with a warning makes you hold off entering any data.
  • Complexity: low.

3. Response technologies

“New Identity”

It closes all your tabs, clears cookies and history and uses new circuits for later connections. The Tor Project describes it as the way to stop your next activity being linkable to the previous one.

  • Risk reduced: two different activities being linked.
  • Strengths: a clean break, in one click.
  • Limits: it does not erase what you have already told a site, or files saved on the device.
  • Example of use: when you finish one search, you use “New Identity” before starting another.
  • Complexity: low.

New circuit for a site

It reloads the current tab over a new circuit. The Tor Project makes clear that it does not clear private information and does not unlink your activity.

  • Risk reduced: a slow exit relay or a site that is not responding.
  • Strengths: it fixes connection problems without closing everything.
  • Limits: it does not separate one activity from another.
  • Example of use: a site will not load, so you try a new circuit.
  • Complexity: low.

Security levels

Tor Browser offers three levels, called “Standard”, “Safer” and “Safest” on the official pages. The first leaves all features on; the second disables site features that are often dangerous, such as JavaScript on sites without HTTPS; the third allows only what static sites need.

  • Risk reduced: vulnerabilities exploited through websites’ more complex features.
  • Strengths: it limits what a page can do on your device.
  • Limits: many sites work less well; a non-default level sets you slightly apart from other users.
  • Example of use: you raise the level to visit sites you do not trust much.
  • Complexity: medium.

4. Governance technologies

Onion services

These are services, such as websites, that can be reached only through the Tor network. The Tor Project explains that their location and IP address are hidden, that all traffic between the user and the service is encrypted end to end and that the address is a string of 56 letters and numbers followed by “.onion”. Some organisations offer an onion version of their website: in 2018 the Tor Project reported that Italy’s national anti-corruption authority had launched its reporting platform in this way.

  • Risk reduced: traffic being watched at the network’s exit; the service being censored.
  • Strengths: the connection never leaves the Tor network.
  • Limits: the addresses are hard to recognise by eye, and a copy with a similar address can mislead.
  • Example of use: you reach a reporting channel through the address published on the organisation’s official website.
  • Complexity: medium.

Bridges

The Tor Project describes them as relays that are not listed in the network’s public directory. Precisely because they are not public, it is harder to block them all: they are intended for people connecting from networks where Tor is blocked. The Tor Project also notes that a bridge can reduce the chance that someone watching your connection learns you are using Tor.

  • Risk reduced: being unable to reach the Tor network where it is blocked.
  • Strengths: they keep access to information open in difficult contexts.
  • Limits: they do not change the rules of the country you are in; how to obtain and use them is explained only on the Tor Project’s official pages.
  • Example of use: someone in a country that blocks Tor reads the project’s pages.
  • Complexity: medium.

Who runs the network

Relays are run by volunteers. The Tor Project explains that it has a team monitoring the health of the network, and that decisions to exclude a relay are taken by the directory authorities, the servers that maintain the list of relays, and only by majority.

  • Risk reduced: dishonest relays staying on the network.
  • Strengths: no single person decides alone.
  • Limits: a malicious relay can operate for a while before being excluded.
  • Example of use: in 2020 a group of exit relays tampering with unencrypted connections was removed from the network.
  • Complexity: handled by the network.

Updates and digital signatures

The Tor Project releases new versions regularly and publishes a digital signature for each file, which lets you check that the program you downloaded is the original.

  • Risk reduced: known vulnerabilities and fake copies of the browser.
  • Strengths: the browser itself tells you about updates.
  • Limits: checking the signature takes a few extra steps.
  • Example of use: you update as soon as the notice appears in the main menu.
  • Complexity: low for updating, medium for checking the signature.

Comparison table

TechnologyGroupRisk reducedComplexityWhen it matters
Relays and the circuitPreventionOne point that knows everythingLowAlways
Layered encryptionPreventionRelays reading the routeNoneAlways
Isolation and anti-fingerprintingPreventionTrackers, recognitionLowAs long as you leave the browser as it is
HTTPS-Only modePreventionUnencrypted last stretchLowLeave it on
The tab’s circuitDetectionNot knowing how you travelLowWhen a site behaves oddly
Check pageDetectionWrong browserLowWhen in doubt
Icons and onion addressesDetectionUnencrypted connectionsLowBefore typing data
“New Identity”ResponseLinked activitiesLowBetween one activity and the next
New circuit for a siteResponseSlow connectionLowWhen a site does not respond
Security levelsResponseRisky site featuresMediumWith sites you do not trust much
Onion servicesGovernanceWatched exit, censorshipMediumWhen an organisation offers one
BridgesGovernanceTor blockedMediumOnly where needed, after checking local rules
Running the networkGovernanceDishonest relaysNetworkKnowing it exists
Updates and signaturesGovernanceVulnerabilities, fake copiesLow-mediumWith every new version

How to choose

  • If you use Tor Browser rarely: leave everything as it is, update as soon as you can and use “New Identity” at the end.
  • If you use it for sensitive searches: check for HTTPS before typing, open files only after the session and consider the highest security level for sites you do not trust much.
  • If you need to reach an organisation: look on its official website for an onion address, and use that.
  • If you are somewhere Tor is blocked: first find out about the local rules and read the Tor Project’s official pages.
  • If your need is different, for example protecting all of a device’s traffic on a public network, the right tool may be a VPN: how it works is explained in the post on how a VPN works.

The rule of thumb: let the default protections do their work and add only what you need: HTTPS always, onion when available, “New Identity” at the end.

How this connects to the Cyber Welfare Framework

PillarHow this content contributes
SkillsKnowing about relays, the circuit, onion services, security levels and “New Identity”, and recognising them in the browser
AwarenessUnderstanding what each point on the network sees, and that no technology protects what you reveal yourself
Secure BehaviourChoosing the protections that fit the situation, without changing the browser more than necessary

Reference level: FL3 — Autonomous, with elements of FL4 — Skilled in the parts on onion services, bridges and security levels. To measure your other digital habits, you can take the digital resilience self-assessment.

Conclusion

The Tor network does not hide everything from everyone. It splits what is known about your connection between three relays, encrypts the route in layers and leaves the browser the job of keeping you unrecognisable. Onion services extend the same protection all the way to the service; bridges keep access open where the network is blocked; “New Identity” separates one activity from another.

None of them protects what you write or the account you sign in to. Used together, and left as they are, they give you back the choice of what carries your name.

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Short reads from the Resources section, for anyone who wants to focus on a single aspect:

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