Tor Browser works quietly. You open a page, the traffic crosses three relays, the site sees an address that is not yours. All the while the browser tells you nothing, and that is as it should be. But precisely because it works quietly, it is easy not to notice when something, usually something we did ourselves, is linking the session back to us.
This post gathers the signs your Tor session is exposing you: some you will find in the browser, others you will notice while you browse. None of these signs, on its own, means your identity has been discovered. Together, they tell you whether the session is still doing what you asked of it: staying apart from you.
It is the diagnostic side of the recommendation on when to use Tor Browser. The ways people who use Tor can be exposed by others are explained in the post on attacks on Tor users.
What these signs are
In cyber security people talk about indicators: traces suggesting that a situation deserves attention. In a Tor Browser session, indicators come in two kinds:
- technical ones, meaning information the browser shows you: the version, the warnings, the circuit, the add-ons installed, the security level;
- observable ones, meaning behaviour you notice while browsing: a site that recognises you, a form with your own data, a document that opens outside the browser.
An indicator is not proof. It is an invitation to take a closer look.
Why they matter more when the session must stay separate
In your everyday browser, a site recognising you is normal, even convenient. In a Tor Browser session it is the opposite: anything that recognises you is one more link. The Tor Project says so frankly: perfect anonymity is impossible even with Tor, and if you sign in to a site, that site does not know your location but does know who you are.
Most links are not created by an attack but by a habit: a sign-in done for convenience, a document opened in a hurry, an add-on installed as in your usual browser. That is why the most useful signs are the ones you can check yourself, in a few seconds. And for the same reason there is no need to feel guilty when you find one: it happens to anyone who moves from their everyday browser to Tor Browser, because our hands do what they always do. What matters is noticing and starting again.
Technical indicators
| Indicator | Where you see it | What it may mean | How much it weighs | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Update notice not yet installed | The browser’s main menu | You are using a version with possible known vulnerabilities | High | Update before you carry on |
| Add-ons that were not there when you installed it | The add-ons page | The browser is more recognisable, or something bypasses Tor | High | Remove them; if in doubt, reinstall from the official source |
| Tor Browser downloaded from a site other than the official one | Download history, name of the site it came from | It could be a tampered copy | High | Uninstall it and download it from the Tor Project’s website |
| Page without HTTPS, or an icon with a warning next to the address | The address bar | The last stretch to the site is not encrypted | Medium-high | Do not enter data; look for the HTTPS or onion version |
| The Tor Project’s check page says you are not on Tor | The check page | You are using another browser or the connection is not going through Tor | High | Close and reopen Tor Browser; do not continue until it is clear |
| Security level or settings changed without your remembering | Security settings | The browser behaves differently from other users’ | Low-medium | Restore the default settings |
Signs you can observe yourself
| Sign | When you notice it | What it may mean | How much it weighs | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| You signed in to a personal account | During the session | The site knows who you are, and can link the whole session to you | High | Sign out, use “New Identity”, start again |
| A site greets you by name or remembers your preferences | As soon as you open the page | There was a sign-in or a cookie of yours in the same session | High | “New Identity” before going on |
| You typed your name, email or phone number into a form | During the session | You gave away the very information Tor was hiding | High | Consider whether it was necessary; next time decide beforehand |
| A downloaded document opened in another program | After a download | The program may have connected to the internet outside Tor | Medium-high | Close it; next time open it after the session, offline |
| Two different activities in the same session | During the session | The two activities can be linked to each other | Medium | Separate them with “New Identity” |
| You shared facts only you know | In a message or a post | The content itself may point to who wrote it | Medium | Reread before sending; take out what is not needed |
Signs on your phone and other devices
The Tor Project also distributes a version of Tor Browser for phones, for some systems. The same signs apply there, with a little extra care:
- other apps do not go through Tor: email, messages and service apps use your normal connection, even while Tor Browser is open;
- a link opened from another app may land in your everyday browser instead of Tor Browser: always check which browser you are in;
- files downloaded on a phone often open in an external app with a single tap: same warning, same caution;
- a shared or work computer may have monitoring software that sees what you do before your traffic enters the Tor network.
In all these cases the check is the same: ask yourself whether what is happening brings your name into the session.
Signs that lie in what you write
There is one kind of sign no browser can show you: the one in the content. A report that mentions a meeting attended by three people, a post with the name of your neighbourhood and the time you walk the dog, a phrase you always use. Tor Browser hides where you connect from, but not what you say.
Before sending anything from a session that must stay apart from you, reread it with one question in mind: who, reading this, could tell I wrote it? If you use a pseudonym, keeping it truly separate from the rest of your online life is the subject of the recommendation on keeping separate identities separate.
A concrete example
A few weeks after her first searches, Helen opens Tor Browser again to read an update on the firm’s story. In the main menu there is an update notice she had not noticed: she installs it straight away.
Then she opens a newspaper’s website. A banner appears at the top: “Welcome back, Helen”. She stops. An hour earlier, in the same session, she had signed in to her subscription to read a paywalled article. From that moment, as far as the newspaper was concerned, the whole session was hers.
Later, to download an official company record on the firm, a public service asks her to sign in with her digital identity. Helen realises that this part cannot be anonymous by design: she does it the next day, in her everyday browser, under her own name.
She closes with “New Identity” and jots down two new rules: I check for updates before anything else, and if a site asks who I am, that activity does not belong in this session.
Nothing serious happened. But the signs were there: an overlooked notice, a greeting by name, a service asking for her identity.
What to check right away
If one of the signs in the tables sounds familiar, these are the checks to make first, in this order:
- Is the browser up to date? Look at the main menu. If there is an update, install it before anything else.
- Did you sign in to anything? If so, treat the whole session as linked to you: sign out and use “New Identity”.
- Are there add-ons you do not recognise? Remove them and, if in doubt, reinstall Tor Browser from the official website.
- Did you open a file during the session? Close it and note what it was.
- Does the page use HTTPS? If not, do not enter data.
- Are you doing just one thing? If there are two activities, separate them.
The full sequence for putting things in order, from prevention to recovery, is in the guide on how to browse anonymously.
If you find a suspicious indicator
Stay calm: in most cases it is a habit that linked the session back to you, not someone looking for you. It makes sense to:
- close the session with “New Identity”;
- start the activity again from scratch, without the action that exposed you;
- update the browser or reinstall it from the official source, if the sign concerns the version or the add-ons;
- if you entered passwords in a suspicious copy of Tor Browser, change them from a device you trust.
If what you do could put you or other people in danger, the next step is not technical: contact a specialist organisation, such as Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline for journalists, activists and civil society or, if you fear monitoring by someone close to you, a domestic abuse helpline such as those listed on GOV.UK.
The related topic, signs that a VPN is not protecting you as you think, is covered in the post on signs your VPN is not protecting you.
What is not an indicator
Some situations look suspicious but are usually normal:
- browsing is slow: that is the price of three relays, as the EFF notes in its guide;
- a site shows repeated checks or does not work: some sites treat traffic from Tor with suspicion;
- the page is in another language or shows content from another country: the site sees the country of the exit relay, not yours;
- the circuit passes through distant countries: relays are spread around the world;
- the first relay in the circuit is always the same: it is a precaution built into the network, not a fault;
- whoever runs your network can see you use Tor: the Tor Project says so openly; it sees that you use it, not what you do.
The rule for telling them apart is always the same: what depends on the network is normal; what brings something of yours into the session is a sign. If in doubt, the cautious choice costs nothing: “New Identity”, and start again.
How often to check
| When | What to check |
|---|---|
| When you open Tor Browser | The update notice and the add-ons |
| Before typing anything into a page | HTTPS and the site’s name |
| After every download | Where the file was saved, without opening it |
| At the end of every session | Sign-ins made, forms filled in, “New Identity” |
| Every few months | That Tor Browser still comes from the official source and is the latest version |
Two important warnings
First warning: no sign is conclusive. A session can expose you without showing any sign, for example when the content of what you write points to who you are. And a session with a sign may have had no consequences. The most reliable check is still the simplest: decide beforehand what you will not do in that session.
Second warning: menus change. The names and positions of options in Tor Browser change from one version to the next. If you cannot find an item, search the Tor Project’s support pages for words such as “update”, “circuit” or “new identity”.
How this connects to the Cyber Welfare Framework
| Pillar | How this content contributes |
|---|---|
| Awareness | Recognising that links to you almost always come from habits, and that a site recognising you is a sign |
| Skills | Knowing how to read the update notice, the add-ons, HTTPS and a tab’s circuit |
| Secure Behaviour | Stopping before a sign-in, a form or a document, and closing with “New Identity” when something does not add up |
Reference level: FL3 — Autonomous. This is the level where you notice what brings your name into a session and know how to put it right. To see where you stand on your other digital habits, you can take the digital resilience self-assessment.
Conclusion
The most common sign is also the simplest: a site that recognises you. It almost always comes from something you did, a sign-in or a form, for convenience. Sometimes it is an overlooked update notice or one add-on too many. In every case the answer is the same: stop, close with “New Identity”, start again without that action.
Noticing is the first step. The second is deciding beforehand, every session, what you will not bring with you.
Related resources
Short reads from the Resources section, for anyone who wants to focus on a single aspect:
- Re-identification: Why a Few Details Can Identify You
- Privacy Focused Browser: The Setting You Use All Day
Related content
- When to use Tor Browser — the recommendation this post comes from
- Attacks on Tor users — how people who use Tor can be exposed by others
- How to browse anonymously — the habits in priority order
- Risks of traceable browsing — what gets hit
- Signs your VPN is not protecting you — the related topic of signs when you use a VPN
Start with the first step: the Cyber Welfare Programme guides you free of charge, one recommendation at a time.




